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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature Of The Case
This case involves the foreclosure of two real estate mortgages on approximately 333 acres
of Valley County land currently used as irrigated pastureland (the "Subject Property"). The
Appellant Lake Cascade Airpark, LLC ("Lake Cascade Airpark") owns adjacent property, consisting
of a rural airstrip, and in 2004 purchased the Subject Property for the purpose of developing it into
a site for recreational homes to be used by patrons of its private airstrip. Donald and Candace Miller
("Millers") and David A. and Karen L. Buich ("Buichs") are the members of Lake Cascade Airpark.
On May 27,2008, Lake Cascade Airpark, Millers and Buichs borrowed $2,450,000.00 from
Respondent Northwest Farm Credit Services, FLCA ("FCS") and they each executed a Note and
Loan Agreement through which they promised, among other things, to repay the amount of the loan
together with interest. Ex. A. That loan was secured by a mortgage lien on the Subject Property.
Ex. B.
At that same time, Lake Cascade Airpark, Millers and Buichs borrowed another $500,000.00
from FCS, as an equity line of credit. Lake Cascade Airpark, Millers and Buichs each executed an
Equity Line of Credit Note and Loan Agreement in which they also promised, among other things,
to repay the amount of the loan together with interest. Ex. D. That loan was also secured by a
mortgage lien on the Subject Property. Ex. E.
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Lake Cascade Airpark and Millers urge this Court to conclude that the Trial Court ignored
substantial and competent evidence, and was therefore clearly erroneous in rendering its judgment
that the Subject Property's reasonable value was, at the time of the trial, $1,501 ,500.00 or $4,500.00
per acre.
Or, in the alternative, Appellants argue that the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying
Lake Cascade Airpark and Millers's post trial motions to amend the judgment and manifestly abused
its discretion in denying their motion for new trial.
Substantial and competent evidence supports the Trial Court's judgment that the Subject
Property's reasonable value was, at the time of the trial, $1,501,500.00. The Court weighed and
took into account the evidence offered by Appellants, i.e., that it was their plan to develop part of
the Subject Property as a recreational home subdivision occupied by patrons using Lake Cascade
Airpark's private airstrip and part of the Subject Property could be developed as a wetlands
mitigation bank.
The Trial Court found Appellants' evidence of value to be speculative and unpersuasive in
light ofFCS's substantial and competent evidence of the Subject Property's reasonable value.
B. Course of Proceedings.

FCS accepts as accurate the Course of Proceedings set forth in the brief of Lake Cascade
Airpark and Millers, at pages 2-3.
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C. Statement of Facts.

When the Subject Property was twice mortgaged to FCS by Lake Cascade in the year 2008,
Lake Cascade Airpark had already acquired the adjacent and abandoned private airstrip ("Cascade
Airstrip"). Tr. 81:20-82:1-7,112:1-16. However, the private Cascade Airstrip is not part of the
Subject Property. Tr. 84:7.
At the time the Subject Property was purchased by Lake Cascade Airpark, the real estate
market in Valley County was very active. There were in-state and out-of-state buyers, mostly
investors, who wanted to develop bare Valley County agricultural lands into residential subdivisions
for recreational use and housing. Tr. 71 :25 - 72: 1-6. That market reflected Lake Cascade Airpark's
vision for the Cascade Airstrip and the Subject Property. Tr. 90: 10, 91: 1-22.
Similar market activity was reflected in an appraisal of the Subject Property completed by
Susan Robbins for FCS in 2008. That appraisal estimated the Subject Property's value at $5,
141,040.00. Development of various Valley County properties were ongoing at that time and similar
properties were actively being sold in the Valley County market for development. Further, existing
agricultural properties in Valley County were being actively developed into recreational and home
subdivisions by these in-state and out-of-state investors. Ex. 2. Tr. 65:7-25, 66: 1-6.
Robbins testified, however, that by 2012 the real estate market in Valley County, like the rest
of the country, had drastically changed. The buyers in the marketplace were no longer in-state and
out-of-state investors and developers looking to develop bare agricultural land into recreational and
residential subdivisions. Valley County real estate was again selling as agricultural lands, at
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agricultural use prices. Tr. 38: 1-5,39:5-9.72:10-25,73:1-2. Interestingly, Donald Miller agreed
that the only Clm-ent sales activity in Valley County related to sales of agricultural lands. Tr.
111: 19-25. Robbins concluded that the market value ofthe Subject Property, at the time oftrial, was
$1,335,000.00. Tr.32:5-9, Ex. H.
Lake Cascade Airpark and Millers assert that the Trial Court's finding that the reasonable
value of the Subject Property, at the time of the trial, was $1,501,500.00 did not take into account
the Subject Property's potential value as a wetlands mitigation bank.
Substantial evidence relating to wetlands was admitted into evidence before the Trial Court.
FCS's appraiser, Susan Robbins, testified that in reaching her opinion of value she considered
fUliher development of the Subject Property into an approved wetlands mitigation bank. However,
she concluded that such further development would be expensive and time consuming, and is not
feasible given the current market conditions in Valley County - there was no evidence that there are
Valley County developers seeking to buy and develop lands in such a way as to require them to also
replace wetlands or purchase wetland mitigation credits. Robbins testified that based upon her
investigation it could take upwards of 10-20 years to sell off any wetland mitigation credits. Tr. 37:
21-25,56:14-24,57:9-25,62:17-21, 63:17-25,64:1-2.
Development ofa wetland mitigation bank would require substantial additional money and
time. Mr. Miller testified that the Subject Property is not currently approved for wetland mitigation
banking. Tr. 96: 18-22. The existing feasibility study, created in 2007 as a preliminary analysis of
the Subject Property's suitability as a wetlands mitigation bank, needs to be updated and re-4-

presented to the Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Tr.
96:23-25, Tr. 97: 1-2.
Mr. Miller testified that updating the feasibility study would cost between $20,000 and
$30,000 and take six months to a year to complete. Tr. 104:1-5. Lake Cascade Airpark and
Millers's expert witness, James G. Fronk, testified that it would cost another $50,000 to $75,000 to
complete the project according to the government approved plans, and that it could take an
additional year to complete those improvements. Tr. 127:24-25, Tr. 128: 1-2l.
Fronk testified that the creation of a wetlands mitigation bank requires the Army Corps of
Engineers to confirm that the completed construction required by the approved plans complies with
the Clean Water Act before the development can be accredited by the government as a wetland
mitigation bank. Only after governmental accreditation can wetland credits can be sold. Tr. 121:
5-25.
Further, Fronk testified that any developer who consumes wetlands through its development
can replace those wetlands in two ways: (1) find areas adjacent to or within the existing development
to build replacement wetlands, or (2) go to a wetland bank and purchase wetland credits. Tr. 122:
12-22. However, Fronk testified that in his 20 years of experience only 100 acres of wetlands had
been developed in Valley County and no wetland mitigation credits have ever been bought or sold
in the Valley County drainage. Tr. 118:22-25,119:1-4,134: 13-16.
Mr. Miller's opinion of value for the Subject Property was $4.5 Million. Tr. 108: 1-6. His
opinion was based on two components: (1) the potential sale of wetlands credits once the plans for
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a wetlands mitigation bank were updated, approved, construction ofthe mitigation bank completed,
and the project received governmental accreditation, and (2) sale ofthe rest of the Subject Property
as part ofa residential airpark. Tr. 108:7-14.
Although testifying that the highest and best use of the Subject Property is for wetlands
mitigation bank and a limited development for an airpark, Mr. Miller admitted that he is unaware
of any existing firm offers for the Appellants' wetland mitigation credits, although there may be
some interest by third paliies "on some basis yet to be negotiated, once it's completed." Tr. 108: 1822, 109: 1-3. Mr. Miller further admitted that there have been no comparable sales of Valley County
propeliy for a wetlands bank, but that many Valley County parcels have sold for agricultural use.
Tr. 111: 19-25.
Based upon these facts, the Trial Court concluded, in paragraph 17 of his Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law that I :
17. After considering all ofthe evidence, the court concludes that the
valuation given by Northwest's appraiser is more credible that (sic)
the one given by Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller's opinion has a large
component of wishful thinking about what might have been if the
market had not taken a disastrous turn for the worse. Northwest's
appraisal appears to be much more in touch with the reality of the
marketplace ..... "
Lake Cascade Airpark and Millers claim that this conclusion is clearly erroneous. FCS, on the other
hand, urges this Court to conclude that the Trial Court properly weighed the conflicting evidence

'R64.
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and testimony and judged the credibility of the witnesses when .it decided that the reasonable value
of the Subject Property was $1,501,500.00 based upon its highest and best use as irrigated
agricultural land and that the development of a residential airpark and wetland mitigation bank, at
this point in time, is wishful thinking.

D. Issues on Appeal
1. Was the Trial Court's decision valuing the Subject Property as agricultural land worth
$1,501,500 or $4,500 per acre based upon substantial and competent evidence?
2. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it denied the Appellants' motions to amend
the judgment or manifestly abuse its discretion when it did not grant the Appellants' motion for a
new trial?

E. Other Issues On Appeal
As the prevailing party, FCS is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal
pursuant to I.A.R. 41, and the attomey fee provisions of the Note and Loan Agreements and
Mortgages admitted into evidence as Ex. A, B, D, and E.

II. LAW AND ARGUMENT
A. Standard Of Review On Appeal
Appellants have correctly summarized, although misapplied, the standard of review
appl icable to the Issues Presented on Appeal.
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The standard of review over the factual findings and legal conclusions of a trial court was
restated by this Court in Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nelson, 136 Idaho 814, 41 P.3d
242, 248 (2002) when it said:
Review of a district court's findings of fact is limited to ascertaining
whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the
findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Roell v. Boise City,
134Idah0214,999P.2d251 (2000)(citingConleyv. Whittlesey, 133
Idaho 265,895 P.2d 1127 (1999). A district court's findings of fact
in a court-tried case are construed liberally on the appeal in favor of
the judgment entered. !d. It is the province of the trier of fact to
weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility
of the witnesses. Id. If the findings of fact are based on substantial
evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they will not be
overturned on appeal. Id.
Continuing at 41 P .3d at 250, this Court said:
Detennining and weighing the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimony offered at trial is best left to the district court judge.
Worzala v. Worzala, 128 Idah0408,413, 913 P.2d 1178,1183 (1996)
("When reviewing factual determinations on appeal, this Court will
defer to the magistrate's weighing of evidence and determination of
witness credibility") (citing Rohr v Rohr, 118 Idaho 689, 691, 800
P.2d 85, 87 (1990) (,,[d]eference must be given to the special
opportunity ofthe trial court to assess and weigh the credibility ofthe
witnesses who appear before it."). This Court generally does not
second-guess the district court's findings unless they are unsupported
by the evidence in the record.
Later, in Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2002) this Court applied the standard of
review, stating:
A trial court's findings of fact" which are based upon substantial and
competent, although conflicting, evidence will not be disturbed on
appeal; which is to say the findings offact will not be set aside unless
-8-

clearlyen·oneous. Dechambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568,
571,976 P.2d 922,925 (1999).
A finding of fact is 'clearly erroneous' only if it is not based upon substantial and competent
evidence. Kraly v. Kraly, 147 Idaho 299, 208 P.3d 281, 284 (2009); Peterson v. Peterson, 153 Idaho
318, 281 P.3d 1096, 1099 (2012), PacificOlp v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 291 P.3d 442,450
(2012).

B. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Supported by Competent and Substantial
Evidence.
Competent evidence must be admissible, relevant and material. Pacificorp v. Idaho State

Tax Commission, 291 P.3d 442,451 (Idaho 2012). "Competency is an evidentiary perquisite to
admission. If evidence is incompetent, it is the opponent's obligation to object to that evidence
offered for admission. Idaho R. Evid. 103." Id. Lake Cascade Airpark and Millers did not object
to the admission of FCS's expert witness appraisal report, Ex. H.

Tr. 32:5-11. That report

summarizes the testimony ofFCS's expert witness, Susan Robbins. Robbins' testimony included
her opinion of value and that testimony was offered without any objection from Lake Cascade
Airpark and Millers. Tr. 32:5-9. Therefore, Robbins' $1,335,000.00 opinion of value is, and Ex.

H. was, without challenge, competent evidence before the Trial Court. That is, the evidence was
admissible, relevant and material.
"Evidence is substantial if 'a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in
determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven." Id., citing The Senator, Inc., 138
Idaho at 569, 67 P.3d at 48.
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The Trial Court's opinion that the Subject Property, at the time of trial, had a reasonable
value of$1 ,50 1,500.00 is supported by 'substantial' evidence. First, there is Exhibit H. and, second,
there is the testimony of Susan Robbins. In combination the exhibit and witness provide competent
evidence to support the value of the Subject Property found by the Trial Court.
Lake Cascade Airpark and Millers attempted to impeach or challenge Robbins' current
valuation based upon her four year old appraisal of the Subject Property completed in 2008. Ex.2.
Ms. Robbins, without any challenge ./i"om, or conflicting evidence presented by Lake Cascade

Airpark or Millers, testified that: the 2008 the real estate market in Valley County was very active;
that there were in-state and out-of-state buyers, mostly investors, who still wanted to develop bare
Valley County agricultural lands into residential subdivisions for recreational use and housing; that
similar development of various Valley County properties was ongoing at that time; and similar
properties were being sold in the Valley County market for development at the prices reflected in
her 2008 appraisal report. Further, Robbins testified that existing agricultural properties were being
actively developed into recreational and home subdivisions by these in-state and out-of-state
investors. Ex. 2. Tr. 65:7-25,66:1-6,71:25 -72:1-6.
Ms. Robbins also testified, without contradiction, that by 2012 the real estate market in
Valley County, like the rest ofthe country, had drastically changed. The buyers in the marketplace
were no longer in-state and out-of-state investors and developers looking to develop bare
agricultural land into recreational and residential subdivisions. Valley County property was again
selling as agricultural lands, at agricultural land use prices. Tr. 38: 1-5, 39:5-9. 72: 10-25, 73: 1-2.
-10-

The Trial Court heard this evidence, and found from it the following 2 :
12. In 2008 she [Robbins] appraised the propetiy at $5,140,000.00
or about $15,400.00 per acre. At the time of the 2008 appraisal, the
Tamarack ski resort development hadjust failed. Nevertheless there
still was a strong and active market in Valley County for substantial
tracts of land with development potential for vacation retreats.
Potential buyers typically were developers, speculators, and non-local
people with an interest in obtaining recreational property. In making
her 2008 appraisal, the appraiser necessarily used comparable sales
that had closed prior to the Tamarack failure.
l3. In 2012 the market for large tracts had disappeared. The failure
of Tamarack and the recession had crushed the real estate market in
Valley County. Developers, speculators, and vacation buyers no
longer were actively pursuing purchases. The only potential buyers
were local ranchers and farmers who were interested in adding to
their agricultural holdings at bargain prices. There were a substantial
number of tracts, both large and small, that had gone into foreclosure
and had come into the possession of lending institutions.
The Trial Court's findings are supported directly by the testimony of Robbins and Ex. Hand
Ex. 2. The evidence is substantial and Appellants offered no evidence to contradict this evidence.
Lake Cascade Airpark and Millers's only conflicting evidence wholly rested upon their claim
that the Subject Property has development potential as a wetland credit bank, which development
potential should have tripled its current value in the marketplace, from $1.5 million to $4.5 million.
It must be recalled that Ms. Robbins considered and discarded the Subject Property's

development potential as a wetland mitigation bank. Tr. 37: 21-25. Mr. Miller's own testimony was
clear: the Subject Property is not currently approved for wetland mitigation banking. Tr. 96: 18-22.
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The 2007 Feasibility Report for the proposed wetlands mitigation bank needs to be updated and represented to the Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Tr.
96:23-25, Tr. 97: 1-2. And, it would cost between $20,000-$30,000 and take 6 months to a year to
complete an update of the feasibility report. Tr. 104:1-5.
Miller's expert witness, Fronk, testified that the cost to complete the wetlands mitigation
bank, once plan approval was obtained, was an additional $50,000 to $75,000 and would take
approximately a year to complete. Tr. 128: 16-17, 21. Thus, perhaps two years following the trial,
the Subject Property may have wetland credits available for sale. But Fronk also testified that
wetland mitigation banking is a new concept in Idaho. Tr.131 :6-13. Fronk also testified that in his
20 years of experience only 100 acres of wetlands had been developed in Valley County and no
wetland mitigation credits have ever been bought or sold in the Valley County drainage. Tr. 118 :2225,119:1-4,134: 13-16.
Mr. Miller's opinion of the Subject Property's value is based on two components (1) the
potential for the sale of wetlands credits once approved, and (2) the sale of the land in the context
of an airpark residential development with access to the Cascade Airstrip. Tr. 108: 7-14.
However Mr. Miller testified that the Cascade Airstrip is not part of the Subject Property.
Access to the Cascade Airstrip by FCS or by a successor owner with intent to develop an airpark is
wholly dependent upon obtaining access to the privately owned Cascade Airstrip. Access to that
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airstrip is by no means guaranteed to anyone who might be interested in developing the Subject
Property as an airpark.
Mr. Miller admitted that there are no existing firm offers for the wetland mitigation credits.
Tr. 108: 18-21. Any interest in the Subject Property is "on some basis yet to be negotiated, once it's
completed." Tr. 109:1-3.
The Trial Court found Mr. Miller's testimony that the value of the land was $4.5 Million
based upon its wetland mitigation credit potential to be mostly wishful thinking. R.64. The
evidence supports that conclusion. The Subject Property is not an accredited wetland bank and
substantial time (upwards of two years) and money ($100,000 plus) would have to be invested in
order to develop the Subject Property into a wetlands credit bank. More importantly, however, there
is no active market in Valley County for wetland credits. That is, there was no evidence before the
Trial Court that today's purchaser would pay $4.5 Million for the opportunity to develop the Subject
Property into a wetlands credit bank.
Having weighed Mr. Miller's testimony, and evaluated his credibility, the Trial Court
concluded that "Northwest's appraisal appears to be much more in touch with the reality of the
marketplace .... " R. 64.
Thus it is clear from the Trial Court's findings that it considered all of the exhibits and
testimony, and in the exercise of reason relied upon Northwest's evidence of value when it
determined the Subject Property's market value. Evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, the
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Trial Court could not rely upon and rejected the conflicting evidence offered by Mr. Miller and Lake
Cascade airpark.
The Trial Court's decision process, as reflected in its Partial Findings and Conclusion and
Partial Judgment,3 is based upon substantial evidence. "Evidence is substantial if a 'reasonable trier
of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been
proven." Pac(ficorp v State Tax Commission, 291 P.3d at p. 451. This Court should not reweigh
the evidence on appeal. Gooby v. Lake Shore Mgmt. Co., 136 Idaho 79, 82, 29 P.3d 390, 393
(2001).
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Appellants' Motions to
Amend Judgment or Manifestly Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Appellants' Motion for For
New Trial

The Trial Court denied Appellants' motion to amend ajudgment under Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(b)
and 59(e) and their motion for new trial under Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). R. 393-403 ("Post-Trial
Motions"). Appellants' Post-Trial Motions only disputed the Trial Court's finding that the Subject
Property's value was $1,501,500.00.
This COUli reviews the Trial Court's decisions on the Rule 52(b) and 59( e) motions under
an abuse of discretion standard and will not disturb the Trial Court's decisions where there is
substantial and competent evidence to suppOli those decisions. Belster v. She/er, 151 Idaho 819, 823,

3R. 58-65
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264 P.3d 926, 920 (2011). The Trial Court's decision to deny a Rule 59 motion for new trial is
reversible only if it is demonstrated that the Trial Court's decision was a manifest abuse of
discretion. Lanham v Idaho Power Co., l30 Idaho 486, 497-98, 943 P.3d 912, 923-24 (1997).
The Trial Court recognized the applicable standard of review in its Order denying the PostTrial Motions. R. 397. The Trial Court correctly perceived the issue as of one of discretion and the
Trial Court's obligation to reach its decision through the exercise of reason, citing to Straub v.

Smith, 145 Idaho 65,71, 175 P.3d 754 (2007). R. 397.
The court carefully has reconsidered the evidence presented at trial
and has throughly reviewed the trial transcript, which the moving
parties submitted in support of their motions. In essence the moving
parties contend that Farm Credit's evidence of value is unwolihy of
belief, while their evidence supports a higher valuation. Their
arguments are not persuasive. The defendants' valuation was based
on facts that may have been relevant in 2008, when the loan
originated. Unfortunately the market for large vacation-development
tracts in Valley County had evaporated by September 2012, close to
the material date for valuation. The evidence is clear that the
mortgaged property may have had special value as an air-accessible
residential development in 2008 with potential for added value if
wetland credits were developed. By September 20 12 it was valuable
only as farm or ranch land, regardless of any hope that the property
might again become ripe for vacation or residential development at
some indefinite future date or that it eventually might have additional
value if wetland credits actually were established. While the 2012
appraisal provided by Farm Credit's expert witness was not perfect,
as she herself admitted, nevertheless it was, more probably than not,
reasonably close to an accurate valuation of the property at the
current time. Certainly it was far more accurate and nearer to
economic reality than the estimate provided by the defendants .... " R.
398.
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Continuing, the Trial Court said:
***The trial court is not required to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the decision winner. The trial court is free to reweigh the evidence. This function involves considerable discretion
in view of the court's opportunity to hear all of the testimony and
examine all the evidence. The trial court may grant a new trial when
it is satisfied that the decision is not supported by or is contrary to the
evidence, or is convinced that the decision is not in accord with the
clear weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice will be
served by vacating the decision, or when the decision is not in accord
with either law orjustice. If the trial court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed it should grant a
new trial. R. 40 l.
Concluding, the Trial Court said:
Having had the opportunity of listening to the witnesses at trial,
having had the opportunity of considering the credibility of each of
the witnesses and his or her testimony, having had the opportunity of
hearing the reasons for the opinions given by the witnesses, having
had the opportunity of reviewing the transcript ofthe trial, having had
the opportunity ofre-weighing the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses without regard to the original decision, and having had the
opportunity of considering the arguments of counsel, the court is
satisfied that its original decision was in accord with the law, the
facts, the right and justice ofthe case. The ends of justice would not
be served by vacating the original decision, and a retrial would not
produce a different result. The court's determination that the
reasonable or fair market value of the mortgaged property was
$1,501,500.00 as of September 25,2012, is correct as a matter of
fact, law, right and justice. R. 402.
From the forgoing excerpts from the Trial Court's order, it is clear that The Trial Court
correctly perceived the issue before it as one of discretion and its obligation to reach its decision
through the exercise of reason.
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The forgoing excerpts confirm that the Trial Court denied the Post-trial Motions through the
exercise of reason. Appellants cannot, and have not demonstrated that the Trial Court's denial of
their Post Trial Motions pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(b) and 59( e) was an abuse of discretion.
Nor have Appellants established that the Trial Court's denial of their Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6)
motion for a new trial was a manifest abuse of discretion.
D. Attorney Fees and Costs On Appeal
FCS seeks costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 41, and the attomey fee
provisions of the Note and Loan Agreements and Mortgages admitted into evidence as Exhibits A,
B, D, and E.
Ex. A, the Note and Loan Agreement dated May 27,2008 provides that:
"Advances, Fees and Costs. All sums advanced by Lender to
protect its interests hereunder or under the Loan Documents shall be
payable on demand and shall become part of the unpaid principal
balance evidenced by this Note. Borrower shall pay Lender on
demand all attomey fees and costs incurred to protect or enforce any
of Lender's rights in bankruptcy, appellate proceedings, or otherwise
under this Note or the Loan Documents .... " Ex. A, page 3. 4
Ex. B, the Mortgage securing Ex. A., states:
13. That in the event of default in any of the covenants or agreements
herein, or in any of the Loan Documents, Mortgagee may, at its
option perform the same, in whole or in part; any advances,

4The exhibits admitted at trial are cited as "Ex." Because the trial exhibits are compiled
and numbered sequentially, the page number of the compilation is cited, as opposed to the page
number of the exhibit itself. Therefore, reference to Ex. A, page 3 refers to Exhibit A and page 3
of the compilation of exhibits, not page 3 of Exhibit A.
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including, without limitation, attorney fees or costs, paid or incurred
by Mortgagee to protect or enforce its rights under the Loan
Documents in bankruptcy, appellate proceedings or otherwise, shall
be payable on demand and shall become a part of the indebtedness
secured by this mortgage. Ex B, page 14.
Ex. D, the May 27,2008 line of credit note, provides the same terms as Ex. A.:

"Advances, Fees and Costs. All sums advanced by Lender to
protect its interests hereunder or under the Loan Documents shall be
payable on demand and shall become part of the unpaid principal
balance evidenced by this Note. Borrower shall pay Lender on
demand all attorney fees and costs incurred to protect or enforce any
of Lender's rights in bankruptcy, appellate proceedings, or otherwise
under this Note or the Loan Documents .... " Ex. D, page 15.
Ex. E, the May 27, line of credit mortgage similarly provides as follows:
13. That in the event of default in any ofthe covenants or agreements
herein, or in any of the Loan Documents, Mortgagee may, at its
option perform the same, in whole or in part; any advances,
including, without limitation, attorney fees or costs, paid or incurred
by MOIigagee to protect or enforce its rights under the Loan
Documents in bankruptcy, appellate proceedings or otherwise, shall
be payable on demand and shall become a part of the indebtedness
secured by this mOligage. Ex E, page 19.
In Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P.3d 723 (2003), this Court stated:
Attorney fees are awardable only where they are authorized by statute
or contract. Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 524
(1984). If the party is claiming that a statute provides authority for an
award of attorney fees, the party must cite to the statute and, if
applicable, the specific subsection ofthe statute upon which the party
relies. Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 15 P.3d 1141 (2000). If the
party bases its claim for attorney fees upon a contract, then the party
must likewise identify that portion of the contract upon which the
party relies as authority for the awarding of attorney fees. The party
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must then provide a reasoned argument, supported by case law as
necessary, explaining why that statutory or contractual provision
entitles the party to an award of attorney fees in this instance.
The attorney fee provisions of the parties' contracts, the notes and mortgages, clearly state
that attorney fees in appellate proceedings are awardable to FCS should this Court affirm the
decision of the Trial Court. No other reasonable interpretation of the contracts can be made. FCS
is entitled by contract to its attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of this appeal because the
Trial Court's decisions below should be affirmed.
FCS, having properly made its claim for attorney fees under LA.R. 41 and having supported
that claim by legal authority, admissible evidence (Ex. A, B, D, and E), and argument, is entitled to
an award of its attorney fees and costs on appeal.

III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the evidence admitted at the time of trial, and the Trial Court's reasoned review
and application of that evidence in reaching its decisions, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's
determination that the reasonable value of the Subject Property was, at the time of trial,
$1,501,500.00.
Further, this Court should conclude that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the Appellants' Post Trial Motions and the Trial Court's decisions in that regard should also
be affirmed.
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Lastly, FCS has demonstrated by evidence, legal authority, and argument its entitlement to
an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of November, 2012.

COOPER & LARSEN, CHTD.
Attorneys for No
Services, FLC

By: ---1~-----7-----------------
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